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Is the Pharmaceutical Industry ina Productivity
Crisis?
lain M. Cockburn, Boston University and NBER
Executive Summary
Rising R&D expenditures and falling counts of new drug approvals since1996
have lead many observers to conclude that there has beena sharp decline in
research productivity in the pharmaceutical industry over the past decade. A
close look at the underlying data, however, suggests that these trendsare greatly
exaggerated: properly measured, research output is unlikely to have fallenas
much as these figures imply, while trends in R&D expenditureare seriously
overstated by failing to account for inflation in R&D input costs. Some of the
increase in R&D investment is a necessary, indeed welcome, response tonew
technological opportuinties and can be expected to deliver a handsome return
of innovative drugs in future years. The rising cost pernew drug approved is
nonetheless a serious cause for concern, particularly where this is driven by
transactions costs and other inefficiencies in the market for basic research, and
by late-stage abandonment of drug development projectson purely economic
grounds. Policies that make "small" markets more attractive, build capacity
in translational medicine, reduce the cost, time, and uncertainty of regulatory
review, maximize access to basic research, and encourage greater cooperation
and collaborative research within the industry that can all contribute togreater
R&D efficiency.
I.Introduction: Crisis, What Crisis?
By many accounts, the pharmaceutical industry is experiencinga
severe decline in research productivity More and more money is being
invested in R&D, but the rate at which new drugs are introduced is
failing to keep pace. Recent years have seena steady flow of reporting
in trade journals and mass media referring to drug companies' "dry,"
"weak," or "strangled" pipelines, and as the FDA's books closed for
calendar 2005 with only 20 new drug approvals, the New York Times
concluded recently that the "research drought" hasgrown worse.2 Cockburn
"The number of new drugs approved by the FDA hasfallen by more
than half since 1996..." while "R&D spending in thepharmaceutical
industry more than doubled." Figure 1.1 replicates the NewYork Times'
graphical display of these data.
Similar trends are apparent in worldwide data, with a recent survey
by The Economist reporting estimates of global industryR&D spending
rising from $3Obn per year in 1994 to $54bn in 2004,with global drug
launches falling from 40 per year to 26 per year over the sameperiod.2
The obvious inference to be drawn from these figures is thatthe "bang
for the buck" in biomedical research is in sharp decline. This is particu-
larly puzzling in the light of the extraordinary advances inbiomedical
science in recent decades. Generous public funding ofresearch in the
U.S. and elsewhere has expanded fundamental biomedicalknowledge
at a remarkable rate. Landmark events like thesequencing of the human
genome are representative of major advances in ourunderstanding of
basic biochemical processes and molecular and cellular biology. Yet so
far the "payoff" in terms of new drugs has been disappointing.
Pharmaceutical R&D has paid off handsomely in the past, most vis-
ibly in areas like depression, cholesterol, and ulcers where newdrugs
have had a huge impact on the practice of medicine, costsof treatment,
and health outcomes. More broadly, statistical studies show anhis-
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introduced and declines in mortality arid other healthindicators across a
wide range of diseases and health problems. Nonetheless,progress has
been disappointing in otherareas. No new broad spectrum antibiotics
have been marketed in almost 40years, and chronic diseases and disor-
ders such as atherosclerosis, diabetes, obesity.Alzheimer's, Parkinson's,
and schizophrenia still lack effective and well-toleratedtreatments.
The apparent disconnect betweenprogress in basic science and
development of new drugs has led regulators, academicresearchers,
investment analysts, and many other observersto the conclusion that
the mechanism for translating science intodrugsprofit-oriented
research and development by pharmaceuticalcompanieshas bro-
ken down. A report issued by the FDA in 2004, forexample, expressed
"growing concern that many of thenew basic science discoveries made
in recent years may not quickly yieldmore effective, more affordable,
and safe medical products for patients," citing fallingnumbers of appli-
cations for approval of new drugs, and placing the blamesquarely on
an "increasingly challenging, inefficient, and costly" product develop-
ment path."3
If this productivity crisis is serious, itpresents policy makers with
some difficult questions. Taxpayers around the world support wellover
$25bn per year of biomedical research: do theseapparently poor out-
comes justify continued public investment at its current scale? What, if
anything, can be done to turn the industry around?
Closer examination of the data in the light ofunderlying trends in
the industry may give, if notanswers, at least some further insight into
these issues. This essay offersa glass-half-full, glass-half-empty inter-
pretation of the productivity crisis. On theone hand, any decline in
"true" research productivity is almost surely severelyexaggerated by
looking simply at ratios ofnew drugs approved to dollars spent on
R&D. Recognizing the flaws in thismeasure leads to the conclusion
that things are not as badas the media reports suggest. Innovation in
the industry. properly measured, is unlikelyto have fallen as drastically
as simple comparisons of counts of annual drug approvalsto trends
in R&D spending indicate. Quality-adjustedoutput, measured in ways
that capture the full value of new drugsto consumers could even be
rising. On the input side, real R&D spending hasnot risen as fast as the
nominal totals, and some substantial portion of theincrease in R&D
is good news rather than badnews, reflecting a rational and welcome
response by industry to a massive expansion of technologicalopportu-
nities, and efforts to better address patients' needs.Cockburn 4
On the other hand, falling rates of newdrug approvals may reflect
increasing focus on more challenging diseases,failure to invest in
human and institutional capacity in"translational medicine," problems
with adapting processes and standards forregulatory review to new
research technologies, and reluctance of drugcompanies to bring for-
ward products with low sales potential.Arid on the input side, some of
the increase in R&D spending mayreflect socially costly effects of the
"dis-integration" and restructuring of the industry overthe past few
decades, as well as inefficiently low levels ofcollaboration and sharing
of precompetitive data. Some of these causesof poor productivity per-
formance suggest opportunities for policyinterventions.
II.Measuring Productivity
Economists usually think about productivity asthe ratio of the "out-
put" of a process to some measure of the"inputs" utilized Interpreting
figure 1.1 in terms of outputs and inputs conveys aclear, and ominous,
message about productivity.Since input (R&D expenditures) is rising
much faster than output (the number of newdrug approvals), their
ratio is fallingwith the clear implicationthat the productivity of bio-
pharmaceutical R&D is in sharp decline.
For some economic activities, this typeof calculation is easy to per-
form, and the results are straightforward tointerpret. For a simple,
repetitive labor-intensive task such as diggingditches, output per man-
hour gives a meaningful measure of productivity.But serious difficulties
emerge when the processhas multiple, heterogeneous, and long-lived
outputs and inputs, when some inputs or outputs arenot directly mea-
sured or priced (e.g., knowledge spillovers),and when output is real-
ized at a different point in time from when the inputs areutilized These
problems are particularly acute in biopharmaceuticalR&D, where R&D
expenditures are incurred over many yearsprior to product launch,
advances draw extensively on un-pricedspillovers from basic research
(often conducted in the public sector), andwhere simple counts of regu-
latory approvals of particular productsattributable to an R&D program
may be a poor proxyfor that program's true output.
Thus, tempting though it may be to look(explicitly or implicitly) at
drug approvals per dollar of R&D spending as a measureof research
productivity, this calculation can be seriouslymisleading. To make
sense of the trendsportrayed in figure 1.1, a closer look at both the
numerator and the denominator of theproductivity ratio is necessary.Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis? 5
III.Measuring Innovative Output in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Counts of Drug Approvals
The annual number of new drug approvals isa popular way to measure
innovative output. Most analystsare careful to distinguish between
regulatory approvals of drug products containing novel activeingredi-
ents (new molecular entities or "NMEs") and the much larger volume
of approvals of products which are minor chemical modifications(new
salts or esters) of existing drugs, new formulationsor dosage strengths,
new combinations of already approved drugs, or new indications. Fig-
ure 1.2 plots annual counts of NMEs approved by the FDA from 1965to
2005, placing the downward trend in approvals since 1996in historical
perspective.4 From 1990 onwards, the series also includesnew biotech
drugs, often called "biological therapeutics," which historicallyhave
moved through a different approval process, andare frequently omit-
ted from counts of drug approvals.5
Although the approval of a new drug normallyrepresents a signifi-
cant advance in therapy, and therefore merits close attention, simply
counting new drug approvals may presenta significantly distorted
picture of the outputs and impacts of biopharmaceuticalresearch.
Introductions of new products to the marketplaceare a very restricted
notion of innovative output, ignoring contributions to the poolof sci-
entific knowledge that will continue to have economic value farinto
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the future. Even within the narrowproduct-oriented notion of output,
by focusing attention exclusively on NMEs,which presume "break-
through" innovation, this procedure gives zeroweight to "incremen-
tal" product improvementswhich have been shownin many other
contexts to account for a very large fractionof total benefits from irino-
vation. It also ignores the fact that not all newdrugs are of the same
quality, measured in terms of their impact on humanhealth or by con-
sumers' willingness to pay.
All Drugs Are Not Equal
Drugs vary significantly in their scientificsignificance, health impact,
and economic value. This heterogeneity in "quality"of drugs means
that simple counts of NIVIEs may seriously mismeasureR&D perfor-
mance. Blockbusters with morethan $1 billion in annual U.S. sales, for
example, are given equal weight to newly approveddrugs that achieve
only $50 million in annual U.S. sales, and drugswhich represent a
major advance in the treatment of disease are giventhe same weight as
the "me-too" products that appear in their wake.The obvious solution
to this would be to weight each drugapproval by a measure of qual-
ity, but systematically measuring differencesin drug quality is surpris-
ingly difficult. A number of productivity analysts of thepharmaceutical
industry have taken a step towards addressingheterogeneity among
drugs through indexing the volume of R&D outputby weighting each
of new drug approvals by its sales volumes. Comanor(1965), for exam-
ple, calculated the output of the pharmaceuticalindustry as the sum of
the first two years' sales of all new chemical entities.But since drugs are
sold into imperfectly competitive markets,characterized by complex
insurance contracts and attendant agency problems,government regu-
lation, and negotiation of prices between manufacturers,third-party
payors, and specialistintermediaries, it is not clear that prices and sales
volumes are good measures of willingness to pay,and few analysts
have attempted to compute the"correct" economic measureof innova-
tive performance based on consumer and producersurplus.
Efforts to account for differences in quality havetherefore tended to
use multi-dimensional measuresof quality. Vernon and Gusen (1974)
decomposed the Comanor output measure into two parts:the num-
ber of newly approved chemical entities (a functionof R&D), and the
discounted sales per newly approved chemical entity over itsfirst two
years, hypothesized to reflect in partmarketing promotional efforts.6Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis? 7
Dranove and Meltzer (1994) defined drugquality in various ways,
including scientific noveltyas measured by whether the FDA granted
the New Drug Application priority rather thanstandard review sta-
tus; number of citations in medical textbooks, medicaljournals, and in
subsequent patent applications; number ofworldwide introductions;
plus U.S. sales in first fiveyears on the market. Dranove and Meltzer
concluded that, based on variousmeasures, higher quality drugs were
being approved more rapidly by the FDA.7Large-scale efforts by regu-
latory bodies to systematically rate the clinicaleffectiveness of different
drugs (such as the NICE process in the UK)or to compute benefits in
QALY or DALY units are anothersource of information that could be
used to improve measures of innovativeoutput.
Without a carefully conducted retrospectiveanalysis of all of the
hundreds of new drugs introduced in thepast 30 years, it is hard to
determine with certainty whether quality-weightedoutput has risen or
fallen over time. Some economic indicatorssuggest that average "qual-
ity" is rising: new products continue to obtainpremium prices in the
face of competition from existing drugs,and R&D-based companies
have seen steady growth in sales despitevigorous generic competi-
tion and increasing focuson cost control by purchasing institutions.
Viewed in long-term perspective it is alsoclear that many of today's
drugs, developed using rational drug designmethods and improved
understanding of fundamental physiology and biochemistry,are signif-
icantly "better" than their predecessors in thesense of greater efficacy,
fewer side-effects, and easier dosing. It isquite unlikely, therefore, that
a properly constructed series on quality-weighted NMEswould trend
downwards.
Incremental Innovation and Product Improvements
A further problem with focusingon counts of NMEs is that any ben-
efits of incremental iimovationare completely ignored. Figure 1.2 is
notable for what is left out, i.e., regulatoryapprovals of new indica-
tions, formulations, and dosages of previouslyapproved drugs. Drugs
are approved on New Drug Application ("NDA")or Biologic License
Application ("BLA") submissions to the FDA. Aspart of the submis-
sion, the sponsor typically provides clinicalevidence in support of FDA
approval for some particular medical condition, knownas the primary
"indication."8 This does notmean that clinical research stops. In many
cases, companies carry out further research in so-called Phase IVtrials,and following submission of the initialNDA/BLA, develop evidence
used to obtain subsequent FDAapprovals for additional indications;
this type of an application is called asupplemental NDA ("sNDA").
For example, the clinical trial thatled Merck to voluntarily withdraw
its acute pain and osteoarthritis agent,Vioxx, in September 2004 was
a Phase W studydesigned to obtain evidence in support of the useof
Vioxx for preventing colorectal cancer.
Most analysts implicitly or explicitlyexclude such "secondary"
approvals when measuring output in termsof the number of new drug
approvals. This flies in the face of considerable,albeit anecdotal, evi-
dence that follow-on discoveries inmedicine can generate very sig-
nificant public health benefits, oftenfor an indication unrelated to the
initial major breakthrough. For example, Spivey,Lasagna, and Trimble
(1987) have stated:
"Examples of this phenomenon include theprotective effects of p-blockers
against myocardial infarction and coronarydeath, the use of p-blockers to pre-
vent migraine and reduce blood pressure,the antiarrhythmic actions of lido-
caine, the use of amantidine to treatparkinsonism, the anti-epileptic efficacy of
carbamazepine, the use of diazepam for statusepilepticus, and the uricosuric
effect of probenecid."9
Research that supports the use of existingdrugs in new indications
can therefore generatesubstantial health benefits. One measure of these
benefits is the utilization and sales volumesfor new indications. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that sales volumesfor supplemental indications
can in some cases beconsiderably larger than sales from the original
primary approved indications. Forexample, while Zantac (ranitidine)
was originallyapproved for treatment of a hypersecretorycondition
known as Zollinger-Ellison syndrome(a relatively rare condition) and
for short-term treatment of activeduodenal ulcer (a considerably more
common condition, but limited toacute episodes), supplementary indi-
cation approvals obtained for Zantacincluded much larger popula-
tions and entailed considerably greatersales volumes, such as those
for treatment for gastroesophageal refluxdisease ("GERD," a severe
but relatively common form ofheartburn), and maintenance of heal-
ing of erosive esophagitis (a commoncondition requiring long-term
treatment).
In addition to the use of a drug in newindications, innovation that
takes the form of improved formulations,delivery methods, and dos-
ing protocols may also generatesubstantial benefits associated with
8 CockburnIs the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis? 9
improved patient compliance, greater efficacyas a result of improved
pharmacokinetics, reduced side effects,or the ability to effectively treat
new patient populations. Again, anecdotal evidencesuggests that these
innovations can generate significant increases in utilizationand sales.
The development of Valtrex (vancyclovir),a pro-drug version of acy-
clovir, for example, enabled utilization of the drugin suppression and
prevention of genital herpes with onceper day dosing, significantly
expanding its use beyond its initial labeling.'0
One economic indicator of the magnitude of thesebenefits is the
extent to which supplemental indication approvals provideincentives
for industrial R&D. The available evidencesuggests that the prospect of
additional sales beyond the initial indication providescommercial jus-
tification for extensive R&D expenditure." Forexample, in their study
of the costs of developing new drugs, DiMasi, Hansen,and Grabowski
(2003) estimate that post-approval R&D is about25.8 percent of total
(pre- plus post-approval) out-of-pocket R&Dcosts ($140 of $543 mil-
lion), whereas in capitalized costs it is about 10.6percent of total costs
($95 of $897 million). CMR International estimates that30 percent of
industry R&D spending is devoted to "line extensions."2
Berndt, Cockburn, and Grepin (2005) looked at sales of drugsin three
large and medically significant therapeutic classes(ACE inhibitors,
SSRI/SNRI antidepressants, and anti-ulcer drugs)and decomposed
sales of each drug according to whether the patientwas given a diagno-
sis consistent with the drug's "primary" indicationor was given a diag-
nosis consistent with "secondary" indicationsor off-label use. In two
out of the three drug classes considered here, utilization inpatients with
diagnoses outside each drug's initially approvedindication accounts
for 70 to 80 percent of total use. While these classesmay not be fully
representative of the entire range of drugs, these resultssuggest that
conventional measures of innovative output basedon counting NMEs
may seriously understate the productivity of research in this industry.
While the number of new NDA/BLA approvals hasdeclined or at best
stayed roughly constant in the last decade, in thesethree therapeutic
classes the number of sNDAs has been generallyincreasing over time,
and these indicators of cumulative incrementalinnovation are associ-
ated with substantial medical and economic benefits.
Again, a broad-based, systematic adjustment to the "standard"out-
put measures to address this flaw is a forbiddingly difficult task.Mason
(2004) recommends correcting the traditionalmeasures of innovative
output by counting each new indication approvalas equal to 0.5 of anCockburn 10
NME, and each major line extension asequal to 0.25 of an NME. Even
this type of crude ad-hoc quality-adjustmentwould likely result in a
substantial revision to perceptions of trends in output.
Time Horizons, Inventory-clearing and OtherStatistical Distractions
A final problem with discussions ofproductivity trends based on
output data such as figure 1.2 is the timehorizon that is used. Media
accounts have depicted a particularlydramatic decline in the produc-
tivity of biopharmaceutical R&D by focusing onthe decline in approv-
als since their 1996 peak year. During theperiod 1996-2005, counts of
NMEs have trended downwards, suggesting asharp decline in research
productivity.
This is, however, something of a statisticalmirage: 1995-1996 were
years in which exceptionallylarge numbers of NDAs were approved,
and approval rates in subsequent years fallwell within historical
norms. Note also that while someof this "bumper crop" is simply the
result of chance (new drug candidates do not enterthe approval pro-
cess on a deterministicschedule), it also appears to have been driven by
the evolving regulatory environment and itsimpact on the FDA. The
"spike" in approvals between 1995 and 1996 maywell reflect the impact
of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act(PDUFA) on FDA review times
and approvals. The PDUFA legislation13 waspassed in an attempt to
reduce the time and cost of drug development,authorizing the FDA to
collect fees from sponsors submitting an NDA,BLA, or a supplemental
NDA, and enabling the FDA to hireadditional review staff to facili-
tate more rapid review.'4 Though thePDUFA legislation only legally
obliged the FDA to "review and act on"NDA/BLA submissions, not
necessarily approve them more rapidly. In essence,PDUFA mandated
responses and action letters from theFDA, but not necessarily approv-
als. Nonetheless, review times appear tohave fallen substantially in the
early-to-mid 1990s, driving a substantial "inventoryclearing" effect.
Though approval times were already falling prior toPDUFA, a care-
ful analysis by Berndt, Gottschalk, Philipson,and Strobeck (2005) of
662 New Molecular Entities submitted to theFDA between 1979 and
2002 shows that after controlling for otherfactors, PDUFA accelerated
the annual percentage reduction of estimatedFDA approval times from
1.7 percent pre-PDUFA to 9.3 percent duringthe five years following
passage of PDUFA, and to 5.3 percentduring the legislation's second
five year period.Is the Pharmaceutical Industry ina Productivity Crisis? 11
Average approval times were about 20months in 1992, but fell to
less than 15 months by 2002, which hasvery substantial implications
for the timing of annual numbers ofapprovals. Assuming that PDUFA
had no impact on the numberor timing of applications, Berndt et al.'s
model can be used to estimate whatapproval rates would have been in
the absence of PDUFA. The resultsare quite startling. Without PDUFA
the peak in annual approvals would have beenboth lower (55 NMEs
versus 62 in fiscal 1996) and later (fiscal 1998versus 1996).15 Perhaps
the most useful way to quantify the impactof PDUFA on drug approv-
als is to look at the model's predictedcumulative number of NMEs
over time. Without PDUFA the cumulative number of NMEsapproved
between fiscal 1992 and 1997 would have been187, rather than the
actual 220a reduction of 33 NMEs,or 15 percent. By the end of fis-
cal 2002, the cumulative number of NMEsapproved since 1992 in the
absence of PDUFA would have been 376, only13 (or 3.3 percent) less
than the 389 that actually occurred. Hence, ina world without PDUFA,
although many patient lives would have beenadversely affected by the
delay in gaining access tonew therapies, at least the apparent decline
in the productivity of biopharmaceuticalR&D would not have been
nearly as dramatic.
Exceptional factors, plus the inherent "noisiness"in counts therefore
make it very difficult to accuratelyassess short-term trends in innova-
tive output from counts ofnew drug approvals. Statements like "lowest
number of drugs approved in the pastten years" or "approvals hit new
low" should therefore be viewedvery skeptically. Perhaps the most
important conclusion to be drawn from figure1.2 is that annual num-
bers of new drugs approved have risen steadilyover the past 30 years,
with no statistically discernable departure fromtrend once exceptional
factors like PDUFA are taken inaccount.
IV.Measuring Inputs to Drug Development
Turning to the input side of the productivityequation, figure 1.3 presents
data on pharmaceutical R&D expendituresfrom 1964-2005. The series
shown here is one which is commonlyused to track pharmaceutical
R&D: worldwide R&D expendituresreported by members of PhRMA,
the trade association for US-based "Big Pharma"companies.'6
The picture is dominated by the steadyupwards growth in R&D
expenditure, at an average rate of almost 12percent per year. Though
















CD 0 (N - N CD0) CD
C)C)C)C)
Figure 1.3







CD 0 (N C) 0 0
C)
new drug approvals,implying a slowdown in productivity, thesedata
should also be treated with caution. Theseries is not adjusted for infla-
tion, and since the prices of resourcesused in R&D have risen over
time, increases in nominal R&Dexpenditures likely substantially over-
state the real increase in resourcesapplied to drug discovery and devel-
opment. For example, theBiomedical R&D Price Index published by
the U.S. National Institutes of Health roseby 55 percent between 1990
and 2004, considerably faster than the33 percent increase in the Gross
Domestic Product price deflator.'7 As inall such efforts to account for
price inflation, separating theeffects of changes in prices from changes
in the composition and qualityof the Biomedical R&D Price Index
components is difficult, and thereliability of any R&D deflator is dif-
ficult to assess. Nonetheless, since the numeratorin this productivity
ratio (number of new drug approvals) is notin monetary units, fail-
ing to deflate R&D expenditures inthe denominator will automatically
induce a downward bias in productivitytrends. After using the NIH
Biomedical R&D Price Index to express R&Din constant 2005 dollars,
the growth rate of R&D spending ishalved to six percent per year for
the period 1964-2005. Duringthe "crisis" period 1996-2005 depicted
in figure 1.1, the difference betweennominal and real growth rates is
similar 8 8 percent versus 5.4 percent.
CDN
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Even after adjusting for input cost inflation,growth in R&D spending
has nonetheless been substantial.18 Butbefore jumping to the conclusion
that productivity measured in NMEsper R&D dollar has fallen signifi-
cantly, it is important to recognize thata contemporaneous comparison
of R&D spending and new drug approvalsis a deeply flawed measure
of productivity. Drug development isa lengthy (and very risky) pro-
cess. A substantial portion of total R&D spenton developing a drug
precedes product approval bymany years. The drug development
process includes preclinical investigations (1-5 years), clinicalstudies
(5-11 years), and regulatory review time (0.5to 2 years). Thus new drug
approvals in any given year toa great extent reflect R&D input expen-
ditures incurred far in the past. This delayedimpact of R&D during the
various phases of developmenton future new drug approvals is not
captured when R&D productivity is measured interms of contempora-
neous R&D expenditures and new drug approvals. Indeed, ifhistorical
relationships hold true, these lengthy lagsin the development process
suggest that the acceleration in R&D expenditureover the past decade
is likely to be followed bya surge in new drug approvals in the next
decade.
Perhaps the most worrying productivitystatistics are those which are
derived from careful project-by-projectaccounting of R&D costs and
outcomes, taking into account thepassage of time (i.e., the opportunity
cost of capital) and the riskiness of developmentprojectsthe "dry
holes" of failed drug candidates. The mostrecent in a series of studies
over the years from the Tufts Center for the Study of DrugDevelopment
(Dimasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 2003) estimatesthe present value of
R&D expenditures to bring a new drugto market to be $802 million
per FDA-approved new drug. In year 2000 dollars, this $802 million
amount is more than 70 percent larger than the $318million figure in
an earlier 1991 study, and almost six times larger than the $138million
figure calculated in a 1979 analysis. 19 Recentindustry estimates of this
figure are now well in excess of $1 billionper successful new drug.
V. Why Are Drug Development Costs GoingUp?
Rising costs per successfulnew drug and rising overall industry R&D
expenditures are alarming. Worldwide total R&Dspending by indus-
try likely now exceeds $80 billion20 and growingpressures around the
world, particularly in erstwhile "safe havens"like the U.S., to limitdrug expenditures call into questionwhether end-user demand can
support substantial further growth.These trends are driven by a num-
ber of factors, some of which areindeed cause for concern, and point
to a variety of policy responses.But careful consideration of thewider
range of underlying causesof increased R&D spending indicates that
things may not be as bad as many commentatorssuggest. So what is
driving these trends?
Mining Out
One appealing hypothesis is "miningout"the idea that the "easy"
(i.e., cheap) scientific problems weresolved in past decades, leaving
the industry with the challengesposed by the biochemistry and dis-
ease pathology underlyingcomplex, subtle, systemic diseases such as
Alzheimer's, which are much more difficult (i.e.,expensive) to inves-
tigate. Many commentators havesuggested that the pharmaceutical
industry is facing sharply diminishingmarginal returns to R&D. Drews
(1998), for example, characterizes drugdevelopment during the 1970s
and '80s as a matter of making minorchemical improvements to exist-
ing compounds directed at astatic set of about 500 well-proven physio-
logical "targets"an activity that surely runsquickly into diminishing
returns. While there is sometruth to this view, it cannot be the whole
story. Economists have longrecognized that technological opportuni-
ties are not finite, and that industriesexperience "recharge" as well as
"exhaustion" of opportunities and inventions.The extraordinary prog-
ress of basic biomedicalsciences has substantially expandedtechno-
logical opportunities: for example, by someestimates the number of
"druggable targets" in the human body hasrisen from 500 to at least
3,000 over the past two decades.2'
Indeed, the pipeline of compounds inearly stages of development
has never been fuller. One industry sourceidentified almost 4,500 com-
pounds in preclinical development in 2004, upfrom less than 2,900 in
1995; with nearly 900 in Phase Iof the development process (prelimi-
nary clinical testing inhumans) in 2004, up from just over 400 in 1995.
Figure 1.4 shows these trends.
Not all of the data about the pipeline isgood. At the other end of the
drug development process, trends inthe volume of new drugs submit-
ted for approval are less clear. TheFDA's "Critical Path" White Paper
reported a steady decline in submissions ofNMEs for both traditional
small molecule drugs and biologicaltherapeutics between 1993 and 2003.
14 CockburnIs the Pharmaceutical Industry ina Productivity Crisis? 15
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But more recent data ismore encouraging: in 2004 NME submissions hit
a five-year high. It should also be recognized that the volumeof submis-
sions is driven partly by the movement ofnew drugs through companies'
development pipelines, largely driven byexogenous scientific factors
such as trial protocols and success ratesat each stage, and partly by com-
panies' decisions about how hard to "push" productsand whether or
when to submit them, whichmay be somewhat responsive to expecta-
tions about regulatory review standardsor market opportunities.
Other indicators also point to vibrantactivity in early stage research,
with venture capital investments in lifesciences reaching a five-year
high in 2005n A significant fraction of theincrease in R&D spending
should therefore be understoodas representing a rational (and wel-
come) effort to exploit these new opportunities.Re-tooling and Industry Transformation
Along with increases in technologicalopportunities, the biopharma-
ceutical industry has also seen dramaticchanges in the tools and meth-
ods used to exploit them. Technologiessuch as ultra high throughput
screening, combinatorial chemistry,microfluidics, gene arrays, and
bioinformatics represent multiple-order-of-magnitudeimprovements
in the technology used to performresearch, but have not been cheap
to acquire. Paralleling theevolution of the R&D model from "random
screening" of candidate molecules to"rational drug design" and "sci-
ence-based" drug discovery, drug companieshave had to acquire a
wide range of costly specialized assetsand human capital, and to invest
in managerial and organizationalinfrastructure to deploy them. At a
more abstract level, thescientific disciplines and knowledge used in
the research process have changedcrudelyput, molecular biology
has supplanted chemistryand a varietyof new disciplines, research
communities, and bodies of knowledge are nowimportant to drug
discovery, such as genomics, proteomics,and metabolomics. All this
has required substantial andsustained investments in acquiring new
capabilities.23
Again, these expenditures represent awelcome and valuable invest-
ment. More broadly, this "re-tooling" processcanbe understood in terms
of the normal process of industry transformation."S-curves" have been
observed in many industries and technologies,where marginal returns
from exploiting a given technology orparadigm are initially low,
become much larger as the technologytakes off, and then decline as the
technology matures. Eventually a new technology appears,typically
developed by new entrants or industry"outsiders" which initially has
poorer performance than theexisting technology (which is dominated
by successful incumbent firms). As the newtechnology enters its take-
off phase, incumbents face a difficultand expensive transition to jump
to the new "S-curve." The drugindustry appears to be going through
just such a period of transformation,with the previously successful
chemistry-based drug development technologyreaching maturity and
experiencing falling marginal returns to R&D,and being supplanted by
a new biology-basedtechnology that is just beginning to payoff. Thisis
sketched out below in figure 1.5.
These episodes of transition are typicallycharacterized by economic
turbulence and associated costs, andfollowed by periods of high mar-
ginal returns to R&D. Over the next decade,all else equal, we should
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therefore expect R&D costs tostabffize, if not decline,as the new tech-
nology enters its "take-off" phase.
Failure Rates in the DevelopmentProcess
As discussed above, the costper approved new drug needs to take into
account the large numbers of candidatesthat fail to meet criteria for
progressing through the phases of clinicaldevelopment, as well as the
opportunity cost of capital. The mathematicsof these calculations point
to one of the major causes of increasedR&D costs per approved drug:
high failure rates, particularly in thelater stages of development. On
average, fully 75 percent of the fully capitalizedcost of developing a
new drug is the cost of failures. Notwithstandingscientific progress in
basic research, these failure ratesare persistently high and very trou-
bling to industry insiders.
Drug development takes placein well-defined phases: Discovery,
where candidate moleculesare identified; Preclinical, where candidates
are tested for toxicology in vitro and in animalmodels; Phase I, where
the drug is tested for safety in smallnumbers of healthy human subjects,
and some initial clinical data iscollected; Phase II, where controlled
trials are used to obtain evidenceon efficacy and toxicity in patients
affected by the disease; Phase III,where clinical trials are conductedon
1990s Timeleffort18
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large numbers of people toestablish definitive data on likely efficacy,
toxicity and side effects of thedrug in widespread use; followedby
submission of the drug forregulatory review; and ultimately,regula-
tory approval that permitsthe drug to be marketed.
Kola and Landis (2004) examined causesof failure of development
projects for the top tenpharmaceutical firms over the period1991-2000,
and found that only 11 percentof compounds tested in manmade it
through to approval for sale. Evenin late stages of clinical development
failure rates reported in thisstudy are disturbingly high: 62 percentof
drug candidates that make itthrough Phase I fail to pass Phase II,and
45 percent of those that dofail to pass Phase 111.24 These late stagefail-
ures are extremelycostly, both because of the expenseof nmning large
scale controlled trials, and becauseexpenditures made much earlier in
the development of the drug haveaccumulated substantial opportu-
nity costs.
Some very interestingfindings in this study relate to changesin the
causes of failure inthese data. Great progress wasmade between 1991
and 2000 in solving problemsrelating to pharmacokineticSand bio-
availability (maintaining therapeuticbut not toxic levels of the drug in
the body). These accounted for morethan 40 percent of drug failures in
1991, but less than 10 percent in2000. Less success was achievedin solv-
ing failures due to toxicologyand safety problems, which roseslightly
to about 30 percent offailures in 2000, and lack ofefficacy, which con-
tinues to account for about 25 to30 percent of failures.
The scientific community inindustry academia, and government
appears to be reaching someconsensus as to why failure ratesfor these
technical/scientific reasons are so high,and how they can be improved.
High failure rates are thought tobe attributable to a numberof fac-
tors. These rangefrom "straightforwardly fixable"problems such as
inadequate training and workforcedevelopment in preclinical research
and investigative medicine, toomuch weight placed on unreliable ani-
mal models, reluctance andregulatory obstacles to move drugsinto
humans more quickly, and poorcommunication and lack of interaction
with regulators, through tomuch less tractable scientific challenges.
Progress in "translationalmedicine" has been limited by theimperfect
state of knowledge in systemsbiology: reductionist science has gener-
ated vast amounts of dataand knowledge at the molecularand cel-
lular level, but progress inunderstanding whole-organism processes
and disease pathology has beenmuch slower. There also seems tobe
growing recognition that lackof collaboration in precompetitiveandIs the Pharmaceutical Industry ina Productivity Crisis? 19
preclinical research, along with excessivesecrecy, "data hoarding" and
efforts to gain exclusive rights to basicresearch tools and data through
the patent system may be increasinglycounterproductive.25
Some of the solutions to these problemsinvolve changes to clinical
testing methodology, such asuse of surrogate endpoints and "biomark-
ers" to provide early quantitative evidenceof efficacy, deployment of
new technologies such as advanced medical imagingto measure clini-
cal outcomes, identification ofpatient subgroups who respond differ-
entially, flexible protocols involving adaptivedosing or "enrichment"
of the sample of patients basedon early identification of positive
responses, as well as greater use of modeling, simulation,and advanced
information technology to collectmore and better data and predict
outcomes. Others involve developinggreater capacity in translational
medicine, in mechanisms for encouragingcollaboration between insti-
tutions, and across the "profit divide" betweenindustry, government,
and academia.
But perhaps the most alarming finding fromthe Kola and Landis
study is the reported increase in the fractionof failures due to essen-
tially economic problems: prohibitivelyhigh manufacturing costs, and
unspecified "commercial" reasons. The shareof failures for these rea-
sons rose from five percent in 1991 to 30percent in 2000. This points to
a very important role of economic and competitivepressures in driving
up R&D costs.
Vicious Circles? The Blockbuster Syndrome
Some observers believe that rising R&Dcosts and falling productivity
are the result of "addiction to blockbusters." Faced withpressure from
financial markets to grow earnings andrealize high rates of return,
drug companies have found the extraordinaryprofitability of success-
ful one-size-fits-all products sold intolarge markets irresistible.26 The
attractiveness of these opportunities combinedwith bfflion-dollar costs
of developing new productsappears to have led many companies to
set very high commercial hurdles for drugcandidates. In order to meet
these high initial sales targets, the WillieSutton Theorem ("that's where
the money is") dictates focusing developmentefforts on the needs of
very large patient populations. But theseare typically crowded, highly
competitive markets where developmentcosts are high (intensive
clinical developmentprograms demand more and larger clinical trials)
and market conditions and sales forecastsare subject to a great deal20 Cockburn
of uncertainty. In these circumstances,lowered sales forecasts are not
unlikely, and if these then fail to meetthe hurdle, can halt develop-
ment quite late in the process.Higher late stage failure rates in turn
have the perverse effect of raising ex-post averagedrug development
costsand thus the height of the bar forfuture candidates. The search
for blockbusters may also promptcompanies to "swing for the fences"
with drug candidates that have novelmechanisms of action, whose
development is both more expensive,requiring novel clinical protocols
and more interaction with regulators,and more likely to fail.
Blockbusters seem likely to remain acompelling goal for drug devel-
opers. But unsatisfactoryresults from pursuing this strategy, new
business models that emphasize"targeted development" and niche
products, and the potential for"personalized medicine" based on
genetic profiling are driving companiestowards a portfolio of mixed
blockbuster and niche products.
Dis-integration, Resource Allocation, andTransactions Costs
Cockburn (2004, 2006) speculates thatother economic forces relating to
the "vertical dis-integration" ofthe industry may also underlie rising
R&D expenditures. A variety of legaland institutional changes during
the 1980s prompted a surge of entry intothe industry at the interface
between for-profit industrial R&Dand public sector research institu-
tions. These small, entrepreneurial,research-focused companies ("the
biotechs") have become an important sourceof new drugs. Relatively
few of them have succeeded in bringing newdrugs to market through
internal development, but Danzon etal. (2005) report that over 1/3 of
new drugs approvedbetween 1963 and 1999 originated inalliances
between industry participants. To anincreasing extent, resource alloca-
tion in drug discovery is moving awayfrom the internal capital markets
of large, vertically integrated firmstowards a "market for technology."
There may well be substantialbeneficial effects on R&D productivity
from this industry restructuring.Specialization of activities is normally
associated with greater efficiency, and allows asuperior market-based
allocation and pricing of risk.Entrepreneurial firms may be able to offer
more powerful and morecarefully tailored incentives to employees.
Entry into an industry typically preventsincumbents from "shelving"
or delaying promisingtechnologies and forces inefficient incumbents
to upgrade or exit. Largefirms often incur substantial costsassoci-
ated with costly, rigid, and conservativeinternal bureaucracies that areIs the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis? 21
necessary to control and coordinate their activities. And openingup a
"market for technology" in the form of licensingdeals and alliances
may well result in a more efficient allocation of resources throughcom-
petition and price signals.27
In the other hand, industry restructuringmay be responsible for
some inefficiencies in R&D, and some (socially)unnecessary spend-
ing. In a world with perfect information,competitive markets, and no
transactions costs, there is no need for vertical integration. Butstepping
away from this benchmark, it has long been clear that largevertically
integrated firms are an efficientresponse to a number of real world
problems. These include the inability to diversifyrisk where capital
markets are incomplete or imperfect, the inabilityto minimize transac-
tions costs when complete contracts cannot bewritten, the inability to
capture spillovers or other externalities, anda variety of familiar diffi-
culties that arise from flaws in markets for information.In fact, there is
a strong presumption that vertical integration is the first best solution
to economic problems such as financing andmanagement of multiple
projects which are long-term, risky, complex, involveactivities which
are costly to monitor, require substantial project-specificunrecoverable
investments, and have shared costs and verticallycomplementary out-
comesi.e., pharmaceutical R&D!
It is far from clear, therefore, whether smallentrepreneurial firms
in this industry have any longrun productivity advantage over large,
vertically integrated incumbents. It is worth noting thatof the many
thousands of well-financed entrants withstrong patent portfolios and
exciting science, only a few hundred have survived.These firms face
significant problems due to their small size, lackof diversification, and
dependence on outside investors. Lerner and Merges(1998) and Lerner,
Shane, and Tsai (2003) show, for example, that theterms of contractual
arrangements between biotech firms and downstream licenseesare
sensitive to their financial condition and capital marketaccess. Small
firms may also have significantagency problems. For example, Guedj
and Scharfstein (2004) show that themanagement of "one horse" bio-
tech firms can inefficientlypursue their only project past the point at
which a more diversified organization would abandonit.
Competitive pressure may also be responsible forsocially wasteful
over-investment in R&D when companies face "firstpast the post"
incentives in technology races, or induce defensiveinvestment by
incumbents who need to strengthen their bargainingposition with
respect to entrants. Resources may also get wastedon bargaining costs,Cockburn 22
payments to intermediaries, extraorganizational overhead dedicated
to seeking out, structuring, andoperating collaborative ventures, as
well as on developing (and litigating)excessively large patent portfo-
lios. One strategic response of largefirms to upstream entry has been
agglomeration, consolidating their control over accessto downstream
markets during the merger wave of the1990s. While the companies
involved frequently claimed that these mergers wereprompted by the
pursuit of R&D efficiencies, this contradictsestimates of economies of
scale and scope in drug discoveryreported by Henderson and Cock-
burn (1996), whose results suggest thatthe productivity benefits from
increasing size and diversity were exhausted atmuch smaller scale
than the research efforts of today's industryleaders.
A final, and perhaps more subtle issue isthat the efficiency of the
"market for technology" in allocating research resourcesis open to
question. Prices in the market for technologylicenses and alliances may
be significantly distorted byinformational asymmetries, thin markets,
bargaining outcomes that reflect large disparitiesin the size, sophis-
tication, and financial situation of the parties,and a variety of other
transactions costs. Using market prices assignals for resource alloca-
tion works well from a social perspectivewhen prices reflect the mar-
ginal opportunity cost of the resourcesemployed. But when market
failure drives a wedge between prices andmarginal opportunity costs,
markets send the wrong signals, and poor decisionsresult.
Evidence on all of these points is scarce. Whetherthe new, vertically
disintegrated industry structure has higher orlower aggregate pro-
ductivity than the previous configurationremains open to question.
Danzon et al. (2005) are optimistic aboutthe productivity benefits of
collaborative research arrangements, but ameaningful counterfactual
is difficult to construct. Cockburn(2004) points out that it will take
decades before enough data accumulates to decidethe issue.
VI.Productivity in the Long Run: Relationships betweenOpen
Science and Industrial R&D
Profit-oriented commercial research and publiclyfunded "Open Sci-
ence" have always been closely linked inthe life sciences. The simplistic
"waterfall" model of innovation wherebyproduct-oriented industrial
research feeds on a steady flow of basicscientific knowledge and
data generated by upstream institutions likeuniversities, public labs,
and foundations is clearlycounterfactual.28 Scientific knowledge,Is the Pharmaceutical Industry ina Productivity Crisis? 23
materials, and personnel have always movedin both directions
across the "profit divide" and the notion that there isa sharp division
of labor between "upstream" basic researchwith no immediate prac-
tical application and "downstream" appliedresearch focused entirely
on marketable products is demonstrably false. Industryconducts a
significant amount of basic researchincreasinglywithin specialist
firms located at the "blurred boundary"between public sector insti-
tutions and profit-oriented organizationsthat hasmade major con-
tributions to fundamental biological and biochemicalknowledge and
Nobel prizes for industry scientists. At thesame time, many publicly
funded labs and researchersare engaged in activity that is indistin-
guishable in many importantsenses from industrial research: screen-
ing compounds, conducting clinical trials, buildingmolecular libraries
and so forth.
Nonetheless, it is clear that publicly-fundedOpen Science, with its
curiosity-driven, investigator-initiated agenda andpriority and pub-
lication-based incentives, is a distinctive andvital component of the
biomedical innovation system. Over the longrun, biopharmaceutical
research productivity depends criticallyon the contributions of Open
Science. Some of these contributionsare easy to see, such as the genera-
tion of new knowledge,new models, new data, and trained person-
nel that are available to industry. Othersare more subtle. For example,
some of the unique institutions of Open Science suchas peer review,
publication, and replication of experimentsprovide important "mana-
gerial infi,tructure" to commercial science,where pharmaceutical
companies use their employees' participation in thewider scientific
community to monitor and reward research activity.29Open Science
also plays an important roleas a public "truth-telling mechanism" on
complex and difficult questions relatingto safety, efficacy, and utiliza-
tion of drugs.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of OpenScience to the pro-
ductivity of pharmaceutical research is itspursuit of a research agenda
that is largely independent of commercialpressures. Industry can, and
does, fund "blue sky" research withno obvious application, as well as
a certain amount of projects directed at economicallyunattractive mar-
kets such as tropical diseasesor rare disorders. But by and large indus-
try research necessarily (and quite appropriately)focuses on topics
with more obvious, and more immediate,application, and overweights
its R&D effort towards products intended fora relatively narrow range
of medical needs. By contrast, the agendaof Open Science, though notimmune to the "demand pull" ofmarket forces, is driven to a great
extent by other factors, principallythe curiosity of individual investi-
gators and community consensus onthe intrinsic scientific intetest of
research topics and questions. Thisindependent research agenda can
overlap the range of topics that industrywould fund in the absence of
public science, but is not confined to it. Overthe long run this research
activity is responsible for generatingthe ideas, data, and paradigms
that are currently not economicallyviable, but which significantly
expand the technological opportunitiesavailable for future exploita-
tion by industry.
Weakening the institutions of Open Science maytherefore prove
to be very costly in futuredecades. Science is becoming increasingly
"propertized" by the enthusiastic participationof universities and
academic researchers in the patent system,and a shift in the locus of
intellectual energy in life sciences towards "justoff campus" entrepre-
neurial companies. This has obvious andpotentially very serious con-
sequences for the directionof academic research. Limited (or just more
expensive) access to proprietary researchtools and data may limit rep-
lication and experimentation, and leadresearchers to avoid important
areas or topics. Academicresearchers may also move effort away from
basic research toward commerciallyattractive topics. However rela-
tively little evidence has been found to suggestthat these problems are
currently having any "first order" impact onthe conduct of Open Sci-
ence. Some surveys haveshown a decline in data sharing in some aca-
demic disciplines (e.g., Blumenthal et al.1997), and an intriguing study
by Murray and Stern (2005) shows asmall but significant impact of
the issuance of a patent on subsequentcitations to its "twin" academic
publication. But other surveys havefound little evidence of substan-
tive obstacles to accessing materials orresearch tools in university
research3° and quantitative studies of thepatenting and publishing
behavior of individual academics havefound no evidence of a substan-
tial substitution of effort away from"pure" research.31 And while the
dystopian prospect of a patent-driven"anticommons" in biomedical
research raised by Heller and Eisenberg (1998)cannot be ruled out, this
type of problem remains thus faronly a hypothetical cause of declining
research productivity.
Unfortunately, as with the effects of industryrestructuring, it is
likely to take many decades before thefull impact of these institutional
changes in the conduct and culture ofOpen Science on the productivity
of industrial research is felt.
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VII."Fixing" Research Productivity
Careful consideration of the factual basisfor claims that the biophar-
maceutical industry is facing a productivity"crisis" suggests that these
are overblown. Declining counts ofnew drug approvals in recent years
are worrisome, but look less dramatic whenstatistical anomalies are
accounted for, and when it is recognizedthat these figures are very
noisy measures of innovative performancethat completely neglect
other important outcomes from R&Dperformed in this industry. Simi-
larly, the trend of increasing R&Dexpenditures is both overstated to
some degree, and also a signal of a likelysurge in approvals of new
(and better) drugs in the next tenyears.
There are, nonetheless, real grounds forconcern, which also pres-
ent opportunities for policy initiatives topositively influence trends in
research productivity and the costs of drugdevelopment.
Lack of capacity in translational medicinecan be addressed by
refocusing public researchsupport towards relevant disciplines, and
by investing in appropriate educationand training. Academic medical
centers are critical institutions in thisarea, combining clinical inves-
tigation with basic research andtraining, and bringing "bench and
beside" together. Historically, much of thisresearch has been funded by
cross-subsidization from payments for patientcare. Azoulay and
Tay (2003) have documenteda significant negative impact of changes
in health care reimbursementson academic medical centers, where
the impact has fallen disproportionatelyon the research budgets
of clinical investigators and physicianscientists rather than labora-
tory researchers. Greater attention to theseadverse consequences of
efforts to control healthcare costs, and development of alternative
direct mechanisms for supporting thistype of research could play an
important role in building and sustainingcapacity in translational
medicine.
To the extent that the verticalstruggle for rents between the bio-
techs and "Big Pharma" is depressingresearch productivity by induc-
ing unproductive defensive expendituresand distorting allocation
of research effort across competingopportunities, steps to encourage
more efficient vertical relationships and greater collaborationmay also
be helpful. Public support of (andparticipation in) researchconsor-
tia, patient pools, and open databasesmay be helpful in this respect,
along with close scrutiny of theterms of access to publicly funded basic
research embodied in university technologylicensing agreements.Finally, in thinking about researchproductivity it may be worth
reflecting on the role played by thepricing and profitability of phar-
maceutical products in directing researchexpenditures. The evidence
that drug companies terminate largenumbers of drug development
projects on commercial grounds suggeststhat many more drug candi-
dates will be brought forward forregulatory review if "small" markets
can be made moreeconomically attractive, thus raising productivity.
Conversely, policies such as price controls,government purchasing, or
weakened patent protection that areintended to reduce drug spending
may carry with themsignificant long term costs in terms of lower rates
of innovation and reduced researchproductivity Scherer (2001) and
others have found a strong contemporaneouslink between drug com-
panies' profitability and their R&Dspending. Reducing the profitabil-
ity of existing products, and loweringthe anticipated returns to future
products will likely cause drug companies toreduce R&D spending,
and one important mechanism bywhich this will occur is decisions to
terminate drug development projects.Absent any functioning mech-
anism to "rescue" suchabandoned projects, these decisions will be
socially very costly in terms of wasted R&Dcosts sunk during the early
stages of developing theseproducts as well as forgone opportunities to
improve human health.
It may also be worth noting thatanother immediate effect of policies
that attempt to shift the burden of financingbiopharmaceutical R&D
away from consumers islikely to be a financial collapse in the biotech
sector, with magnified consequencesfor innovation in the industry as a
whole. The biopharmaceutical industry nowrelies very heavily on tools
and new products generated by thesesmall and financially fragile special-
ist firms, which, unlike Big Pharma,have very limited ability to finance
continued research out of internal cashflow. Concerns are already being
expressed about the adverse impact ofthe drying up supply of research
tols from this sector as venturecapitalists changed their focus towards
"product" companies in recent years. Asubstantial decline in investors'
willingness to keep injecting resourcesinto this sector may therefore
result in a socially costly loss of criticalresearch capacity
Recent increases in R&D spending inbiopharmaceuticals will gener-
ate a future payoff in the formof innovative new medicines. But the
size of this payoffthe "bang forthe buck" ultimately realizedis con-
tingent on a favorable policy environment.As patent policy, health care
finance, medical education and other issues cometo the forefront of the
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policy agenda, their impacton research productivity in this important
industry merits careful consideration.
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Endnotes
"Drugs in'05: Much Promise, Little Payoff." TheNew York Times, January 11, 2006.
"Testing Times." The Economist (June 16, 2005), citingestimates by CMR International.
"Innovation or Stagnation: Challengeor Opportunity on the Path to New Medical
Products." FDA White Paper, March 2004.
NME counts for 1990-2005 are from the FDAwebsite, and for 1964-1989 are from
Graham (2005).
Like "small molecuie" drugs, thereare large numbers of approvals of biotech products
which are for new formulations, indicationsetc. These counts are taken from Tufts Center
for Study of Drug Development publications(Reichert 2004), where "novel biological
therapeutics" (e.g., monoclonal antibodies andrDNA-derived proteins) are defined anal-
ogously to NMEs, excluding additional indicationsand formulations, as well as blood
products and vaccines.
Other early studies of R&D productivity includeBaily (1972) and Wiggins (1981), each
of which use the number of new chemical entitiesas the measure of output.
An earlier study by Wardell and DiRaddo (1980)discusses using a compromise of
commercial and technological successmeasures to quantify innovation, where techno-
logical success was determii-ted bya consensus expert panel.
Occasionally, several distinct indicationsare simultaneously approved with the initial
NDA/BLA.
Spivey, Lasagna, and Trimble (1987),p. 368. For related discussions, see Beales (1996)
and the references cited therein.
See Corey et al. (2004).
Critics of the industry often argue that this R&Dexpenditure is unnecessary, directed
principally at artificially extending the innovator's"franchise" beyond the period of pat-
ent protection associated with the original approval.
Quoted in Frank (2003).28
Cockburn
The PDUFA was first passed in 1992, andthen renewed in the Food ands Drug Act of
1997, and again in the Bioterrorism PreparednessAct of 2002.
For further details, see Carpenter, Chernew,Smith, and Fendrick (2003).
Annual counts of approvals can be quitedifferent depending on whether calendar
year or fiscal year data areused, driven by a strong "December effect" presentin the tim-
ing of approvals. See Graham andBerndt (2006).
It is important to recognize that this seriesdoes not include R&D conducted by com-
panies based in Europe or Japan, expenditureby non-PhRMA members (principally bio-
tech companies) or public sector research.
Taken online fromhttp://ospp.od.nih.gOv/ec0studiesThp12sP Last accessed
March 25, 2006.
As noted above, expenditures byPhRMA members are only a fraction of the
worldwide R&D effort that generates newdrugs. Since 1990, R&D by European-
based companies has been equivalent toabout 80-90 percent of the amount spent by
U.S.-based companies, and R&D by Japanesecompanies has been 30-50 percent of the
U.S.-based amount, though these figures aremuddied by exchange rate movements and
other reporting problems. The growth rateof the PhRIvIA series is probably a reasonable
proxy for the growth oftotal worldwide R&D spending by pharmaceuticalcompanies,
provided spending by non-U.S. companies is inroughly constant proportion. But the
growth rate of total commercial R&D islikely understated by the PhRMA series, since
expenditures by biotech companies are omittedand these have increased significantly
over time.
Earlier studies in this series include Hansen(1979) and DiMasi, Hansen, Grabowski,
and Lasagna (1991).
$39bn reported by U.S.-based PhRMAmembers, $l2bn by non-PhRMA members
based in the U.S. (Burrill & Co survey) plus atleast $25bn by Europe-based biopharma-
ceutical companies (EPFIA), and at least $8bn inJapan, Australia, and countries with an
emerging research capability.
Hopkins and Groom (2002).
National Venture Capital Association, January24, 2006 news release. http: / /www.
nvca.org/pdf/Moneytree05Q4Finame15ePvisited February 12, 2006.
See Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson(2003), or Cockburn, Henderson, Orsenigo, and
Pisano (1999).
Other studies have found similar attrition ratesfor small molecules, for example
DiMasi (2001).
See the FDA "Critical Path" White Paper,and e.g. Korn and Stanski (2005).
Even more so where senior managers'compensation has a high-powered stock price-
based component and investors focusdisproportionately on blockbusters.
See Gans and Stem (2000), Gans, Hsu,and Stem (2002), Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardeila (2001).
See, for example, Cockbum and Henderson(1998), Henderson and Cockbum
(2001).Is the Pharmaceutical Industry ina Productivity Crisis? 29
Cockburn and Henderson (1994), Cockburn, Henderson,and Stern (1999).
Walsh, Arora, and Cohen (2003) and Walsh, Cho, andCohen (2005) report results
from surveys conducted for the National Academies.
See Azoulay, Ding, and Stuart 2006; and Breschi, Lissoni, andMontobbj 2005.
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